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Legislative Reform of the State Secrets
Privilege
Robert M. Chesney*
Few issues more directly implicate the tension between the
rights of the individual and the government's interest in
preserving national security than the state secrets privilege. This
has long been true, but in recent years the use of the privilege in
connection with high-profile litigation arising out of post-9/11
events and policies-most notably the activities within the United
States of the National Security Agency and the Central
Intelligence Agency's rendition program-has generated an
unprecedented level of controversy, as reflected in litigation,' in
the media,2 in the work of interest groups, 3 and in legal
* Associate Professor, Wake Forest University School of Law. I wish to thank
Peter Margulies, David Logan, and the other symposium participants for
their thought-provoking comments and questions. A modified version of this
essay also appears as written testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in connection with a hearing held on February 13, 2008, titled
"Examining the State Secrets Privilege: Preserving National Security While
Protecting Accountability."
1. See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (denying motion to dismiss suit relating to NSA activity on state
secrets grounds); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007)
(affirming dismissal of rendition lawsuit on state secrets grounds).
2. Various newspapers have criticized the use of the privilege by the
Bush administration. See, e.g., Ben Wizner, Shielded by Secrecy, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2008, at A25; Editorial, Balance of Powers, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 3, 2008,
at E6; Editorial, Secrets and Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at A18.
3. See, e.g., The Constitution Project, Reforming the State Secrets
Privilege (May 31, 2007), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Reforming-
theStateSecretsPrivilegeStatement.pdf; Robert E. Stein, Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities Association of the Bar of the City of
New York: Report to the House of Delegates, 2007 A.B.A. REVISED REPORT
116A, available at http://fas.org/sgp/jud/statesec/aba081307.pdf.
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scholarship. 4  This controversy has spurred interest in the
prospects for legislative reform of the privilege, culminating
recently in the introduction of the State Secrets Protection Act
(SSPA), a bill that would both codify and reform key aspects of the
privilege. 5
The SSPA warrants attention both for narrow reasons
relating to the privilege itself, and broad reasons relating more
generally to the theory and practice of separation of powers. From
the narrow perspective of the state secrets privilege, the SSPA
would introduce a number of significant changes to current
practice, including limitations on the government's ability to
justify its assertion of the privilege through ex parte submissions
and its ability to obtain dismissal at the pleading stage of suits
implicating state secrets. From the broader perspective of the
constitutional separation of powers, the SSPA raises difficult
questions concerning the power of Congress to legislate
substantive and procedural rules governing the disclosure of
information relating to national security and diplomacy, and the
degree of deference, if any, that judges should give to executive
officials in connection with factual assertions relating to such
topics.
I do not propose to resolve all of these issues in this essay. I
do hope, however, to enrich the ongoing debate by distinguishing
that which should be controversial in the SSPA from that which
should not be, by proposing less problematic solutions in a few
instances, and by highlighting the relationship of these somewhat
technical questions to broad background considerations of
constitutional structure.
4. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National
Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1249-50 (2007); Carrie
Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through
Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99 (2007); Amanda Frost, The
States Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931
(2007); William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive
Power, 120 POL. ScI. Q. 85 (2005); Louis FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL
SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 212, 245
(2006).
5. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008).
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I. A THUMBNAIL SKETCH OF THE PRIVILEGE IN CONTEXT WITH RECENT
DEBATES
The privilege emerged gradually in U.S. jurisprudence during
the 1800s, reaching maturity only after the Supreme Court
acknowledged, elaborated, and applied it in its 1953 decision
United States v. Reynolds.6 In its modern form, the privilege
attaches when two conditions are met. It must be asserted with
the requisite formalities, 7 and a judge must be persuaded by the
government's assertion that disclosure of the information at issue
would pose a reasonable risk of harm to national security or
diplomacy.8 In making that determination, the judge typically
considers classified affidavits filed by the government on an ex
parte basis.9 In those cases in which the privilege is asserted with
respect to a particular document or item, the courts often will also
examine that item itself on an ex parte basis (though Reynolds
itself discourages courts from doing this when it can be avoided).' 0
6. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). For an overview of the origins and evolution of the
privilege, see Chesney, supra note 4.
7. The privilege can only be asserted by the head of the executive
department charged with responsibility for the information in question, who
must undertake a personal review of the matter at issue. See Reynolds, 345
U.S. at 7-8.
8. See id. at 8-10. In the petitioner's brief in Reynolds, the government
had advanced the view that the government official's invocation of the
privilege should be binding upon the court, citing an array of separation of
powers arguments boiling down to a claim of exclusive executive authority
under Article II with respect to national security and diplomatic matters. See
Brief for the Petitioner at 15-16, Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (No. 21), 1952 WL
82378 ("Our position is that under the doctrine of separation of powers and
under the statute implementing this doctrine the courts have no power to
compel the heads of the executive departments to produce such documents..
• ."). The court in Reynolds concluded, however, that "[judicial control over
the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers."
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10. And while it is true that elsewhere in the opinion
the court stated that the government's position had "constitutional overtones
which we find it unnecessary to pass upon," id. at 6, the conclusion the court
actually reached regarding the role of the judge in adjudicating an assertion
of the privilege nonetheless implicitly rejects the claim that judges
constitutionally are bound to accept executive conclusions with respect to the
harm that public disclosure might cause in a given case. See id. at 7-8.
9. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1306.
10. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-11. The Supreme Court in Reynolds was
dealing with a tort suit brought by widows whose husbands had died during
the crash of an Air Force B-29 that had been engaged in a flight to test
classified radar equipment. Id. at 2-3. The privilege issue arose when the
2008]
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Notably, the privilege is absolute rather than qualified and thus,
once it attaches, it cannot be overcome.
11
In some contexts application of the privilege merely tends to
limit discovery, as occurred in Reynolds itself.12 In such cases, the
significance of the privilege is relatively limited; it functions as a
ground for resisting discovery requests, permitting the suit to
continue on the basis of the non-privileged evidence that may be
available to the parties. In other contexts, however, the privilege
can be fatal to the litigation, as where the "very subject matter" of
the litigation itself constitutes privileged information or litigation
of the case otherwise necessitates disclosure of such information. 
13
The El-Masri extraordinary rendition lawsuit, for example, was
dismissed on this basis. 14
As noted above, post-9/11 invocations of the privilege have
generated considerable controversy. 15 By and large, criticisms of
the privilege tend to fall under either or both of two headings.
First, some contend that that the Bush administration elects to
resort to the privilege significantly more frequently than did its
predecessors. 16 Framed in its most persuasive terms, this is a
harmful development not just because it forces more individual
litigants to suffer injustice in the name of the greater good, but
also because it tends to shield a greater swath of executive branch
conduct from judicial review and, hence, from democratic
accountability. Second, some contend that apart from numbers,
the Bush administration has used the privilege in a qualitatively
different way than its predecessors, invoking it as grounds for
dismissal at the pleading stage irrespective of whether the
plaintiff ever would require discovery of protected information
widows sought production of the Air Force's post-accident investigative
report. Id. at 3. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that there was no need
to review the report itself to reach the conclusion that public disclosure of the
details of the radar equipment would be harmful to national security. See id.
at 10-11. Many years later it was revealed, however, that the report did not
actually contain details relating to the radar equipment in the first place.
See FISHER, supra note 4, passim.
11. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir. 2007).
12. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
13. See id. at 11 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)).
14. See, e.g., El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 306.
15. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
16. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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from the government in order to maintain his or her suit.17 Again,
the cost is framed in terms both of the burden on individual
litigants and society's interest in ensuring that the judiciary is
available to check unlawful executive branch conduct.18
I addressed both lines of argument in an earlier article,
reaching conclusions unlikely to please either the administration
or its critics. 19 On one hand, I concluded that the quantitative
and qualitative critiques are mistaken insofar as they attribute
the harms associated with the privilege to the Bush
administration in particular. 20  Quantitative criticisms-that is,
claims that the Bush administration has misused the privilege by
invoking it with greater frequency than in the past-are
misguided primarily because the number of suits potentially
implicating the privilege vary from year to year, and thus there is
no reason to expect the number of invocations to remain constant,
or even relatively so, over time.21  Qualitative claims-that is,
claims that the Bush administration is attempting to use the
privilege in unprecedented contexts or in search of unprecedented
forms of relief-also do not withstand scrutiny.22 The fact of the
matter is that the privilege has had a similarly harsh impact on
litigants for decades. 2
3
On the other hand, I also recognized that cautious legislative
reform might be possible and appropriate in this area, particularly
in light of the rule of law and democratic accountability issues
bound up in some uses of the privilege. 24  "To say that the
privilege has long been with us and has long been harsh is not to
say ... that it is desirable to continue with the status quo."2 5 The
17. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 4.
19. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1301-07.
20. See id. at 1307.
21. We also have no way of knowing with confidence how many privilege
invocations actually occurred in any given year, under this administration or
its predecessors. Many invocations do ultimately result in published judicial
opinions, but not all do so. Numerical claims therefore have to be taken with
a rather large grain of salt. I say that advisedly, having provided in my own
article a table identifying all of the published opinions adjudicating state
secrets claims between 1954 and 2006. See id. at 1315-32.
22. See id. at 1306-07.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 1308.
25. Id.
2008]
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real question, then, is how to craft reforms that will improve the
lot of meritorious litigants and enhance compliance with the rule
of law while simultaneously preserving legitimate national
security and diplomatic interests.
II. THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REFORM THE PRIVILEGE
Before examining the particular ways in which the SSPA
seeks to achieve the aforementioned goals, it is worth pausing to
ask whether there are limits to the power of Congress to reform
the state secrets privilege.
Everyone agrees that there is a state secrets privilege, but
there is sharp disagreement with respect to its actual nature.
Those who favor reform tend to describe it as a mere evidentiary
rule adopted by judges through the common law process, a
conclusion suggesting plenary legislative power to amend or even
eliminate the privilege. 26 From this perspective, the question of
legislative authority in this context is merely an extension of the
well-settled principle that Congress has "power under Article I,
Section 8 and Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution to
prescribe regulations concerning the taking of evidence in the
federal courts."27
Others take the view that the privilege is not mere common
law creation, but instead a constitutionally-required doctrine
emanating from Article II, with the consequence that Congress
either cannot modify the privilege or at least is significantly
constrained in doing so. 28 In this account, "the privilege is rooted
26. See, e.g., State Secrets Privilege: Rep. Jerrold Nadler Holds a Hearing
on Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 10 (2008) (statement of Kevin S. Bankston) ("The
state secrets privilege is an evidentiary privilege . . . well established in the
law of evidence, not in Constitutional law . . . it is well within Congress's
prerogative to reform the common law of evidence by statute.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
27. State Secrets Privilege: Rep. Jerrold Nadler Holds a Hearing on
Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 10 (2008) (statement of Hon. Patricia M. Wald).
28. See State Secrets Privilege: Rep. Jerrold Nadler Holds a Hearing on
Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 10 (2008) (statement of Patrick F. Philbin).
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in the constitutional authority of the President as Commander in
Chief and representative of the Nation in foreign affairs to protect
the national security of the United States,"29 and "is not merely a
common law evidentiary privilege subject to plenary regulation by
Congress." 30
The best explanation, arguably, incorporates both
perspectives. As a historical matter, there is little doubt that the
privilege emerged as a common law evidentiary rule, very much as
did the attorney-client privilege and similar rules that function to
exclude from litigation otherwise-relevant information in order to
serve a higher public purpose. 31 It does not follow, however, that
the privilege has no constitutionally-required aspect. In at least
some circumstances, for example, the state secrets privilege
conceptually overlaps with executive privilege-a doctrine
explicitly derived from constitutional considerations. 32  And
although executive privilege is merely a qualified rather than an
absolute privilege in most contexts, the Supreme Court did go out
of its way in United States v. Nixon to raise the possibility that the
answer might differ with respect to an assertion of executive
privilege pertaining to military or diplomatic secrets. 33
In any event, let us assume for the sake of argument that the
state secrets privilege serves constitutionally-protected values
29. State Secrets Privilege: Rep. Jerrold Nadler Holds a Hearing on
Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 10 (2008) (statement of Hon. Patricia M. Wald).
30. Id.
31. For an account of the emergence of the privilege, highlighting the role
that influential treatise writers played in constructing and spreading
awareness of the concept in the 1800s, see Chesney, supra note 4, at 1270-80.
For a different perspective, one that emphasizes the British experience with a
comparable doctrine, see William G. Weaver & Danielle Escontrias, Origins
of the State Secrets Privilege (on file with author), available at http:/!
works.bepress.com/williamweaver/l/.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-13 (1974);
Attorney General Janet Reno, Memorandum for the President: Assertion of
Executive Privilege for Documents Concerning Conduct of Foreign Affairs
with Respect to Haiti (Sep. 20, 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov
/olc/haitipot.htm; Morton Rosenberg, CRS Report for Congress: Presidential
Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent
Developments (Sep. 17, 2007), at 1, available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy
/RL30319.pdf.
33. 418 U.S. at 706, 710.
2008]
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relating to the executive branch's national security and diplomatic
functions. Would it follow that Congress is disabled from
regulating in this area? It is not obvious that it would. Indeed,
some forms of regulation would seem clearly to remain within the
control of Congress in the exercise of the authorities mentioned
above, even if other forms of legislation might prove more
controversial. The key is to distinguish between legislation
regulating the process by which privilege assertions are to be
adjudicated, and legislation that functions to override or waive the
privilege itself.
At a minimum, Congress should have authority to regulate
the process through which assertions of the privilege are
adjudicated. This would include, for example, the power to codify
prerequisites to the assertion of the privilege (such as the
Reynolds requirement that the privilege be invoked by the head of
the relevant department based on personal consideration of the
matter)34 or to require particular procedures to be followed by the
court in the course of resolving the government's invocation.
Whether Congress should be able to override the privilege once it
attaches-for example, by compelling the executive branch to
choose between conceding liability in civil litigation and disclosure
of privileged information in a public setting-is far less clear. That
question may be academic, however, at least so far as the SSPA is
concerned. A close review of the bill suggests that most if not all
of its provisions are best viewed as process regulations.
It does not follow, of course, that all the changes contemplated
in the SSPA are wise. On the contrary, there are at least a few
elements in the bill that go too far in seeking to ameliorate the
impact of the privilege. Congress may have the authority to adopt
these measures notwithstanding the competing constitutional
values involved, but it is advisable to emphasize less-intrusive
reform options whenever possible.
III. THE SSPA IN COMPARISON TO THE STATUS Quo
Perhaps the best way to come to grips with the SSPA is to
compare its provisions to current practices relating to the
privilege, with an eye towards distinguishing that which is mere
codification of the status quo from that which constitutes a
34. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953).
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substantial change. It helps, moreover, to conduct this
comparison in a way that corresponds to the conceptual sequence
of questions a judge must resolve when confronted with an
invocation of the privilege. This approach demonstrates that a
substantial part of the SSPA merely codifies practices that either
are required or at least are common under the status quo, and
should not be objectionable now. That said, there are a few
aspects of the legislation that constitute significant breaks with
current practice. Those provisions warrant more careful
consideration. In a few instances, there are alternative
approaches that might strike a better-and more sustainable-
balance among the competing equities.
A. The Formalities of Invoking the Privilege
The threshold question in any state secrets privilege scenario
is whether the privilege has been invoked with the requisite
formalities. In theory, such requirements serve to reduce the risk
that the privilege will be invoked gratuitously. The SSPA does not
introduce any significant innovations under this heading, but
rather codifies existing practice.
Under the SSPA, "the United States shall provide the court
with an affidavit signed by the head of the executive branch
agency with responsibility for, and control over, the state secrets
involved explaining the factual basis for the claim of privilege." 35
This closely tracks current practice. Reynolds requires a "formal
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has
control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by
that officer." 36 Both the SSPA and current practice, moreover,
limit invocation of the privilege to the United States. 37
B. The Substantive Test for Application of the Privilege
The substantive scope of the state secrets privilege is a
function of three variables: subject matter, magnitude of harm
that might follow from public disclosure, and the degree of risk
that such harm might be realized. Though there is room for
35. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. § 4054(b)
(2008).
36. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8.
37. Compare S. 2533, § 4054(a) with Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
2008]
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disagreement on this point, the best view is that the SSPA does
not depart significantly from the status quo with respect to any of
these three variables.
Consider first the question of subject matter. Under the
SSPA, information must relate to "national defense or foreign
relations" in order to qualify for privilege. 38 The status quo at
least arguably encompasses a similar range of topics. 39
The next question is whether the SSPA tracks the status quo
with respect to the magnitude of harm that might follow from
public disclosure of the information in question. The SSPA frames
the inquiry in terms of "significant harm."40  There is no
comparable terminology in Reynolds, nor has any standard
terminology on this question of calibration emerged in that case's
progeny. Nonetheless, it is difficult to view the "significant harm"
standard as a meaningful change from the status quo. Reynolds
itself admonished that the privilege was "not to be lightly
invoked,' implying that de minimus harms should not come
within its scope.
The third issue under this heading concerns the probability
that disclosure of the information actually will precipitate the
feared harm. Under both the status quo and the SSPA, that
variable is framed in terms of "reasonable" risk.42
38. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4051.
39. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1315-32 (specifying nature of
information at issue in published state secrets adjudications between 1954
and 2006).
40. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4051.
41. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
42. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4051 ("[Tjhe term 'state
secrets' refers to any information that, if disclosed publicly, would be
reasonably likely to cause significant harm to the national defense or foreign
relations of the United States.") (emphasis added). Reynolds actually is vague
with respect to the question of how strong the likelihood of harm from
disclosure must be (most of its discussion of risk concerns the distinct
question of whether and when judges should personally examine allegedly
privileged documents en route to making a decision on the privilege), but
courts nonetheless appear to understand Reynolds to require a reasonable-
risk standard. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th
Cir. 2007).
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C. Authority to Decide Whether the Privilege Attaches: The Role
of the Judge and the Question of Deference
In its brief to the Supreme Court in Reynolds, the government
had contended, that "the power of determination is the Secretary's
alone."43  That is to say, the government argued that courts
cannot and should not second-guess the determination of the
relevant executive branch official that disclosure of the
information in question would be harmful.44 Among other things,
the government reasoned that executive officials are far better
situated than judges to assess the probable consequences of a
disclosure. 45 On the other hand, unchecked authority to assert
the privilege naturally would give rise to assert the privilege in
circumstances where the substantive standard is not met, whether
out of an excess of caution or even as a shield for misfeasance.
The Supreme Court ultimately gave greater weight to that
offsetting concern, holding in Reynolds that "[j]udicial control over
the evidence in the case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of
executive officers," and insisting that the judge have the final say
with respect to whether the privilege attaches.46
This general principle is no longer seriously contested, but the
relative authority of the judge and the executive branch
nonetheless continues to be a matter of controversy because of
lingering questions regarding how much deference the judge
should give to the executive's claim, even if the claim is not
strictly binding.47 In El-Masri, for example, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the "court is obliged to accord the 'utmost
deference' to the responsibilities of the executive branch" when
determining the harm that might follow from a disclosure. 48 Such
deference was owed both "for constitutional reasons" and for
"practical ones: the Executive and the intelligence agencies under
43. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 8, at 47.
44. See id.
45. See id. (stating that the government's position rests in part "on
reasons of policy arising from the fact that the department head alone is truly
qualified and in a position to make the determination").
46. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9-10.
47. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 305 (4th Cir. 2007)
("The Executive bears the burden of satisfying a reviewing court that the
Reynolds reasonable-danger standard is met.").
48. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
20081
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his control occupy a position superior to that of the courts in
evaluating the consequences of a release of sensitive
information."4 9  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit stated in Al-
Haramain that it "acknowledge[d] the need to defer to the
Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security and
surely cannot legitimately find ourselves second guessing the
Executive in this arena."5  In light of such statements, some
might argue that judges have final authority to determine the
applicability of the privilege only in formal terms, while the
mechanism of deference shifts that authority back to the executive
branch in practical terms.
The SSPA codifies the status quo insofar as it plainly
contemplates that the judge shall have the ultimate responsibility
for determining whether the privilege should attach.5 1 In its
current form, however, it makes no attempt to regulate the degree
of deference, if any, that judges should give to the executive
branch's judgment regarding the consequences of a disclosure.
D. The Mechanics of the Judge's Review: Evidentiary Basis for
the Ruling
1. When Specific Documents Are in Issue
The paradigm state secrets privilege scenario involves an
attempt by a private litigant to obtain a particular item during
discovery, as occurred with respect to the post-accident
investigative report in Reynolds.52 When the government claims
privilege in that context, it typically justifies its assertion with an
explanatory affidavit from the official asserting the privilege. 5 3
But should the judge also review the item in question in the
course of determining whether the privilege should apply?
The SSPA departs from the status quo to a small extent with
49. Id.
50. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th
Cir. 2007).
51. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, 110th Cong. § 4054(e)
(2008) (describing the judge's role in determining whether the privilege
attaches).
52. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 3 (1953).
53. See, e.g., Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1202 (referring to "classified and
unclassified declarations" filed by the Director of National Intelligence and
the Director of the NSA).
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respect to this issue. Under the SSPA, judges not only can, but
must review the actual item of evidence. 54 Under the status quo,
in contrast, they are expressly admonished in Reynolds to be
reluctant to require such in camera production unless the litigant
has shown great need for the document.
55
The SSPA's requirement of in camera disclosure reflects a
lesson derived from the original Reynolds litigation. Famously,
the plaintiffs in Reynolds had sought production of an Air Force
post-accident investigative report in connection with their tort
suit, prompting the government to invoke the state secrets
privilege on the ground that the report contained details of
classified radar equipment.5 6 The Supreme Court concluded such
details could not be disclosed publicly, which is a plausible
conclusion under the substantive test described above. 57 Although
it did not follow that the accident report necessarily contained
such details, the court assumed that it did and found the privilege
applicable on that basis. 58 Notoriously, it turned out much later
that the report did not contain substantial details about the
radar. 59 Thus conventional wisdom holds that the privilege ought
not to have been invoked on that basis, something that almost
certainly would have been revealed by judicial inspection of the
document.6 °
Reynolds thus has come to stand for an important, common-
54. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(d)(1) (requiring the
United States to submit for the court's review not only an explanatory
affidavit but also all evidence as to which the privilege has been asserted).
55. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-12.
56. See id. at 3-4.
57. Id. at 12.
58. Id.
59. See FISHER, supra note 4, 167-68.
60. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10-12. But see Examining the State Secrets
Privilege: Protecting National Security While Preserving Accountability, I10th
Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Nichols] (statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Carl Nichols, House Comm. on the Judiciary), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ola/views-letters/1 O-2/02-26-08-s2449-sunshine-
litigation-act.pdf (arguing that the report in privilege invocation in Reynolds
was proper because the report contained technical details relating to the
operations of B-29 bombers, separate and apart from details relating to the
radar equipment); Herring v. United States, No. Civ.A.03-CV-5500-LDD,
2004 WL 2040272, at *5-6, *9 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (holding that the Air Force had
not committed fraud in Reynolds because the B-29 data justified application
of the privilege), affd, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005).
20081
456 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 13:442
sense proposition: where the privilege is asserted in connection
with a particular document the government seeks to withhold
from discovery, the judge should ensure that the item in question
actually contains the allegedly-sensitive information said by the
government to warrant application of the privilege. It is
important to note, however, that this type of mistake does not
seem to occur frequently under the state secret privilege today.
Notwithstanding language in Reynolds cautioning judges not to
conduct in camera inspections unnecessarily, courts today
routinely do examine documents personally in an effort to
determine whether the privilege should attach,61 The change that
would be wrought by the SSPA on this issue, accordingly, is to
remove any question as to whether this should be done.
2. When Abstract Information Is in Issue
Not every invocation of the privilege arises in connection with
requests for production of specific documents or records capable of
being inspected. The government may also have occasion to
invoke the privilege in connection with discovery requests seeking
protected information in the abstract, as with an interrogatory or
a deposition question. In such cases there is no specific document
or item for the court to review, other than the explanation offered
by the government in the form of an affidavit from the official
asserting the privilege. In that respect, the SSPA's requirement
that such an affidavit be submitted merely codifies the status
quo.
6 2
3. When Pleading Would Require Revelation of Privileged
Information
A similar scenario arises at the pleading stage when the
allegations in a complaint would reveal state secrets if admitted or
61. See, e.g., Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1203 ("We reviewed the Sealed
Document in camera... )".
62. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(b). In that sense,
the SSPA's adoption of an affidavit requirement is unexceptionable. But
there is a problem with respect to the related requirement that the classified
affidavit be accompanied by an unclassified version for public release: one
might read that provision to preclude the judge from being able to order the
unclassified document to be sealed. As a general proposition, it seems unwise
to deprive (or to risk depriving) judges of discretion to seal any particular
document in this sensitive context.
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denied. Here, however, the SSPA introduces a useful innovation
that functions to put off the question of whether the privilege
properly applies to the information at issue. Under SSPA §
4053(c), the government may simply plead the privilege in
response to such allegations, rather than admitting or denying
them as otherwise required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(b). 6 3 The allegation(s) in question presumably then would be
deemed denied,64 without any need for the judge at that stage to
consider whether the privilege in fact attaches to the information
at issue. Arguably the government could have achieved the same
result under the status quo by objecting on privilege grounds to
particular allegations in a complaint, though it is not clear that
the government ever pursued such a course. In any event, this
aspect of the SSPA at a minimum is a useful clarification, even if
not an outright alteration of what is permitted under current
practice.
E. The Mechanics of the Judge's Review: Ex Parte and In
Camera Procedures
When reviewing the government's invocation of the privilege,
should the judge permit the government to submit some or all of
its explanation on an in camera, ex parte basis? In current
practice, the government routinely submits classified documents
and affidavits on an ex parte basis in the course of asserting the
privilege. 65 The court alone reviews these submissions; they are
not made available to opposing counsel.66 As a result, the process
of determining whether the privilege attaches is in an important
sense non-adversarial. This approach is optimal from the
perspective of ensuring against an improper disclosure of the
information, but it is far from optimal from the perspective of
ensuring against inaccurate determinations by the court.
63. Compare State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4053(c) with FED. R.
CIv. P. 8(b).
64. The text currently provides that "[n]o adverse inference shall be
drawn from a pleading of state secrets in an answer to an item in a
complaint." State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4053(c). This language
should be amended to more clearly state that a privilege plea should be
treated as a denial for pleading purposes.
65. See Chesney, supra note 4, at Appendix.
66. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
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Both values are substantial. The question, therefore, is
whether there are solutions that would sufficiently preserve the
government's interest in security while simultaneously reducing
the risk of error by introducing elements of adversariality in the
review process. In a major departure from the status quo, the
SSPA seeks to accomplish precisely this.
1. Ex Parte Proceedings
The SSPA would break with current practice significantly by
limiting the ability of the government to justify its invocation of
the privilege through ex parte submissions. First, § 4052(a)(3)
recognizes that the judge has discretion as to whether ex parte
submissions will be allowed at all, subject to the "interests of
justice and national security."67 There is little doubt that judges
in most cases would exercise this authority wisely. 68 Even if the
judge decides to permit ex parte filings in the first instance,
however, § 4052(c)(1) appears to ensure that before ruling upon
the government's invocation of the privilege, the otherwise ex
parte filings will be subject to at least some degree of adversarial
testing:
67. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4052(a)(3). As an alternative
to precluding ex parte filings, § 4052(a)(2) permits the judge to order the
government to provide the other litigants with a "redacted, unclassified, or
summary substitute" of its ex parte submissions. State Secrets Protection Act,
S. 2533, § 4052(a)(2). This authority in practice may turn out to track status
quo procedures in which the government typically provides both a classified
affidavit justifying its assertion of the privilege and also an unclassified
version that can be made available to opposing parties and to the public.
68. The comparable provision in the Classified Information Procedures
Act (CIPA) permits but does not on its face require the government to submit
its filings ex parte. See CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 3, § 4 (1980). That said, it
appears that no court has ever barred the government from making its
application ex parte. See DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS § 24.7 (2007) (observing that
"[although this procedure denies the defendant the ability to make a
meaningful challenge to the government's arguments, no court in a published
decision has prevented the government from filing its Section 4 application ex
parte and in camera."). This suggests that judges can be trusted not to act
rashly, but perhaps also that there is little point in providing an option to bar
such filings. CIPA § 6 hearings, in contrast, are required to be in camera but
are not normally ex parte. See CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(a). Such hearings
arise in a distinguishable context, however, insofar as the defendant in that
scenario already possesses classified information, information that the
government seeks to suppress.
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A Federal court shall, at the request of the United States,
limit participation in hearings conducted under this
chapter, or access to motions or affidavits submitted
under this chapter, to attorneys with appropriate security
clearances, if the court determines that limiting
participation in that manner would serve the interests of
national security. The court may also appoint a guardian
ad litem with the necessary security clearances to
represent any party for the purposes of any hearing
conducted under this chapter.69
There is considerable wisdom in injecting some degree of
adversariality into the ex parte portion of the privilege
adjudication process. The trick, however, is to manage this
without undermining the overriding goal of ensuring that there is
no disclosure of the assertedly-protected information unless and
until the judge determines that it is not in fact protected. Under
the SSPA approach, the parties' own attorneys might be given
direct access to the government's most sensitive secrets prior to
determining whether they are in fact privileged. This goes too far,
assuming that there are less intrusive alternatives available that
might also address the accuracy considerations described above.
And, as noted above, § 4052(c)(1) actually contains such a middle
ground alternative, in the form of a guardian ad litem
mechanism.
70
The guardian ad litem approach has the virtue of ensuring at
least some degree of adversarial testing, while reducing the risk of
a leak (to the parties themselves or to the public at large) in
comparison to having the party's own attorneys involved. For this
reason, other countries are experimenting with precisely this
approach in analogous contexts. Canada, for example, recently
adopted a "special advocate" system in which attorneys are
appointed for the specific purpose of contesting otherwise ex parte
information used by the government in connection with removal of
non-citizens from the country.71 The U.K. has a comparable
69. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4052(c)(1).
70. See id.
71. See An Act to Amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
(certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to
another Act, B. C-3, 39th Parliament, 2nd Sess. (2007) (as reported by Comm.
on Pub. Safety and Nat'l Sec., Dec. 10, 2007) available at http://www2.
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system, originally designed for comparable immigration
removals.7 2  Unlike the SSPA's guardian mechanism, however,
the Canadian system does not allow the court to appoint just any
attorney to this sensitive role, but instead requires the appointee
to be chosen from a pre-determined list of screened and qualified
individuals. 73
In order to strike a more reasonable and sustainable balance
between the competing equities at stake in this sensitive context,
§ 4052(c) should be amended to focus attention on the guardian
mechanism as a solution to the adversariality problem (that is to
say, the more extreme alternative of ordering the government to
provide access directly to the parties' attorneys should be
removed). At the same time, the guardian mechanism should be
amended to create a pre-selected list of attorneys eligible for such
an appointment. Such a list could be created by the Chief Justice
of the United States, for example, and following the Canadian
example might also involve substantial training for the potential
appointees. 74  This solution is not ideal from the litigant's
perspective, but even from that viewpoint it does constitute a
substantial improvement over the status quo.7
5
2. In Camera Proceedings
Beyond the question of whether filings and arguments will
take place on an ex parte basis is the question of whether and
when privilege litigation should take place in camera, without
public access. 76 Under the status quo, judges typically employ a
blend of ordinary and in camera procedures when adjudicating an
assertion of the privilege. 77
parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Bills/392/Government/C-3/C-3_2/C-3_2.PDF.
72. Special Immigration Appeals Act, 1997, c. 68, § 6 (Eng.).
73. See supra note 71, at B, C-3, § 85.
74. See Richard Foot, Lawyers Line Up To Become Special "Terror"
Advocates, NAT. POST., Feb. 17, 2008, available at http://www.nationalpost
.com/news/canadalstory.html?id=315669.
75. It is worth noting, in that regard, that nothing comparable is
available to criminal defendants-whose very liberty is at stake-in the
analogous context of § 4 proceedings under the CIPA, in which ex parte
review is the rule. See supra note 68.
76. An in camera procedure is not necessarily ex parte, though the two
concepts are conflated often. See, e.g., CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 4, § 6(a).
77. See, e.g., A1-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d
1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting courts consideration of ex parte
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The impact SSPA § 4052(b)(1) would have on this practice is
unclear but it will likely not constitute a significant departure
from the status quo. This section establishes a default
presumption that hearings concerning the state secrets privilege
will be conducted in camera, and permits public access only "if the
court determines that the hearing relates only to a question of law
and does not present a risk of revealing state secrets."78
F. The Mechanics of the Judge's Review: Special Masters
One of the core difficulties associated with judicial review of
the state secrets privilege involves the question of expertise.
Critics of the status quo argue that judges in practice merely
rubber-stamp executive invocations of the privilege because the
judges do not feel confident that they can evaluate the executive's
claims regarding the impact of disclosure on security or
diplomacy, 79 while others draw on the same notions to contend
that judges should in fact be extremely, if not entirely,
deferential. 80 And certainly it is true that a federal judge on
average will not be as well-situated in terms of experience and
fact-gathering resources as the Director of National Intelligence or
the Secretary of State to assess such impacts.81 At the same time,
Reynolds itself acknowledges that the judge has ultimate
responsibility for ensuring the validity and propriety of privilege
assertions, lest the privilege become a temptation to abuse.8 2
The tension between these values appears intractable at first
glance, but there are mechanisms for ameliorating the problem.
Some scholars point out, for example, that judges currently have
authority to appoint expert advisers such as special masters under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 and independent experts under
Federal Rule of Evidence 706.83 Section 4052(f) of the SSPA
submissions in addition to public filings).
78. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4052(b)(1).
79. See FISHER, supra note 4, at 167-68,
80. See Nichols, supra note 60.
81. See, e.g., Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1203 ("[W]e acknowledge the need
to defer to the Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security
and surely cannot legitimately find ourselves second guessing the Executive
in this arena.").
82. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953).
83. See, e.g., Meredith Fuchs & G. Gregg Webb, Greasing the Wheels of
Justice: Independent Experts in National Security Cases, 28 A.B.A. NAT'L
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would clarify that such authorities in fact can be used in
connection with state secrets litigation, an approach that may
prove particularly valuable in cases involving assertion of the
privilege with respect to voluminous materials.
84
G. Consequences Once the Privilege Attaches: Substitutions
SSPA § 4054(f) provides that where the privilege attaches,
courts should consider whether it is "possible to craft a non-
privileged substitute" that provides "a substantially equivalent
opportunity to litigate the claim or defense."85 Drawing on the
model set forth in the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA) § 6,86 the SSPA goes on to specify several options that
might be used in that context, including an unclassified summary,
a redacted version of a particular item of evidence, and a
statement of admitted facts. 87 Where the court believes that such
an alternative is available, it may order the United States to
produce it in lieu of the protected information. 88 The U.S. must
comply with such an order if the issue arises in a suit to which the
U.S. is a party (or a U.S. official is a party in his or her official
capacity), or else "the court shall resolve the disputed issue of fact
or law to which the evidence pertains in the non-government
party's favor."89
It is not clear that any of these provisions depart from what a
court could order even in the absence of the SSPA. But in any
event, it is certainly advisable to codify the judge's obligation to
exhaust options that would permit relevant and otherwise-
admissible information to be used without actually compelling
disclosure of that which is subject to the protection of the
privilege.
SEcURITY L. REP. 1, 3-5 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/nat
security/nslr/2006/NSLReport_2006_l 1.pdf.
84. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4052(f).
85. Id.
86. See CIPA, 18 U.S.C. App. 3, § 6.
87. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533m, 110th Cong. § 4052(f) (2008).
88. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(f)(1)-(3).
89. Id. § 4054(g). No sanction is provided by the SSPA for scenarios in
which the U.S. is merely an intervenor. See id.
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H. Consequences Once the Privilege Attaches: Ending Litigation
The most controversial aspect of current doctrine may well be
the sometimes fatal impact it has on litigation once the privilege is
found to attach to some item of evidence or information. As
discussed earlier, this phenomenon is not new. The government
has moved to dismiss (or in the alternative for summary
judgment) in these circumstances with some frequency since the
1950s, and such motions frequently have been granted.90 But the
use of this approach in high-profile post-9/11 cases-particularly
those relating to NSA surveillance and to rendition-has proven
especially controversial, drawing attention to the fact that
application of the state secrets privilege can have harsh
consequences for litigants even where the litigants allege unlawful
government conduct. 91 Accordingly, one of the most important
questions associated with the SSPA is whether it would limit the
set of circumstances in which application of the privilege proves
fatal to a suit.
1. When Denial of Discovery Precipitates Summary Judgment
Under current doctrine, application of the privilege can prove
fatal to a suit in more than one way. First, the privilege may
function to deprive a litigant of evidence needed in order to create
a triable issue of fact, and hence survive a summary judgment
motion.
Let us assume that a judge has denied a discovery request
based on the state secrets privilege. If it so happens that the
plaintiff has no other admissible evidence sufficient to raise a
triable issue of fact with respect to a necessary element of his or
her claim, this discovery ruling necessarily exposes that plaintiff
to summary judgment under Rule 56.92 In that setting, the Rule
56 ruling conceptually is subsequent to the state secrets ruling,
rather than based directly on it. The discovery ruling is no less
fatal to the plaintiffs case for that, however, and if the motions
90. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1306-07, 1315-32.
91. See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (denying motion to dismiss suit relating to NSA activity on state
secrets grounds); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007)
(affirming dismissal of rendition lawsuit on state secrets grounds).
92. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56.
2008]
464 ROGER WILLLAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:442
happen to be adjudicated simultaneously, it might even appear
that the court has granted summary judgment "on" state secrets
grounds. It does not appear that the SSPA is intended to alter the
outcome in this scenario, though it might be wise to clarify that
this is so in the text of the legislation.
2. When the Government Must Choose Between Disclosing
Protected Information and Presenting a Defense
A second scenario that can prove fatal to a claim under
current doctrine arises when the government would be obliged to
reveal protected information in order to present a defense to a
claim. This scenario differs from the first in that the plaintiff may
be able to survive summary judgment with the evidence it has
assembled. The problem here is not the plaintiffs efforts to
acquire evidence, then, but the fact that the government must opt
between presenting a defense and maintaining the secrecy of
protected information. In that setting, current doctrine provides
for dismissal on state secrets grounds.
In some senses, the SSPA codifies this result. Under § 4055 a
judge may dismiss a claim on privilege grounds upon a
determination that litigation in the absence of the privileged
information "would substantially impair the ability of a party to
pursue a valid defense,"93 and that there is no viable option for
creating a non-privileged substitute that would provide a
"substantially equivalent opportunity to litigate" the issue.94 But
§ 4055 also mandates that the judge first review "all available
evidence, privileged and non-privileged" before determining
whether the "valid defense" standard has been met.95  This
suggests that the judge is not merely to assess the legal
sufficiency of the defense (assuming the truth of the government's
version of events, in a style akin to adjudication of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion), but instead is to resolve the actual merits of the defense
(including resolution of related factual disputes).96 If that is the
correct interpretation, it would seem to follow that § 4055
93. State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4055(3).
94. Id. § 4055(1). For what it is worth, § 4055(2) also requires a finding
that dismissal of the claim or counterclaim "would not harm national
security." Id.
95. See id. § 4055.
96. See id.
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contemplates a mini-trial on the merits of the defense. 97
The problem with this approach is that the court may or may
not permit the use of ex parte and in camera procedures in this
context. 98 Denying either protection (but especially the latter)
would put the government on the horns of a dilemma, forcing it to
choose between waiving a potentially-meritorious defense, and
revealing privileged information to persons other than the judge
even in the face of the judge's conclusion that the information is
subject to the privilege. This approach is questionable from a
policy perspective insofar as it would force the government to elect
between partial or even complete exposure of concededly protected
information and the loss of a meritorious defense and hence
potential civil liability (including injunctive as well as financial
consequences). And for similar reasons, this approach presumably
will precipitate constitutional objections as well. At a minimum,
therefore, § 4055 should be amended to provide that the judge's
assessment of the merits of a defense must take place on an in
camera basis. Any move away from ex parte procedures in this
context, moreover, should be limited to the modified guardian-ad-
litem mechanism recommended above. Beyond that, it might also
be wise to structure the judge's review of the defense at issue in
terms of a Rule 12(b)(6)-style legal-sufficiency inquiry rather than
as a mini-trial. 99
3. When the Very Subject Matter of the Action Implicates State
Secrets
One scenario remains. Under current doctrine, "some matters
are so pervaded by state secrets as to be incapable of judicial
resolution once the privilege has been invoked." 100 The idea here
is not that certain discovery should be denied to the plaintiff, nor
that the government has a defense it could present if only it were
not necessary to preserve certain secrets. Rather, the notion is
that some types of claims are not actionable as a matter of law
because they inevitably would require disclosure or confirmation
of state secrets in order to be properly adjudicated. Under this
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
100. See E1-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir. 2007).
20081
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approach, a suit may be dismissed at the pleading stage even if
the plaintiff could have assembled sufficient evidence to create
triable issues of fact on all the necessary elements of a claim, and
even if the government is not prevented by its secrecy obligation
from presenting a defense to that claim. Not surprisingly, this is
the most controversial dismissal scenario in current doctrine.
The SSPA overrides this result in the narrow sense that it
permits suits to survive that under current doctrine would have
been dismissed at the very outset. First, as noted above, the
SSPA permits the government to avoid affirming or denying
sensitive fact allegations by citing the privilege in its responsive
pleading.' 0 ' Second, § 4053(b) plainly states that "the state
secrets privilege shall not constitute grounds for dismissal of a
case or claim" unless, as described above, the government has a
"valid defense" it would present but for privilege concerns. 10 2
Taken together, these provisions require cases in what might be
called the "very subject matter"10 3 category to go forward at least
to the discovery stage.
Ultimately, however, the SSPA will not necessarily spare such
suits from dismissal. During the course of discovery, the privilege
remains wholly functional as a shield against production of
protected documents or information, which may expose the
plaintiff to summary judgment in the end. The SSPA expressly
authorizes the government to use the privilege as a sword,
moreover, enhancing the prospects for dismissal in the "very
subject matter" scenario. 10 4 Specifically, § 4054(a) states that the
government may not only use the privilege to resist discovery, but
also "for preventing the introduction of evidence at trial."'1 5 Much
turns on the interpretation of this language.
This language appears to allow the government to move to
suppress otherwise-admissible evidence in the plaintiffs
possession, on state secrets grounds. In that case, a plaintiff who
is otherwise able to assemble sufficient evidence to create a triable
issue of fact without discovery from the government, nonetheless,
101. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4053(c).
102. Id. § 4053(b).
103. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953) (citing Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)).
104. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(a).
105. Id.
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may find himself or herself without critical evidence at trial,
necessitating judgment in the government's favor. The only
question then would be whether the government must await the
plaintiffs case-in-chief in order to exercise this suppression power,
setting the stage for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule
50(a), or if it, instead, could exercise this option prior to trial and
thus proceed under Rule 56.106 The language of § 4054(a)
suggests the former, but if the option is to be allowed at all it
makes far more sense from an efficiency perspective to permit pre-
trial resolution. 10 7  Section 4054(a) accordingly should be
amended to say as much. 108
The important point is that the "sword" aspect of § 4054(a) 10 9
will likely produce an end result comparable to that under the
current doctrine's "very subject matter" line of cases. 110 The
difference, which is by no means unimportant, is that under the
SSPA the litigation process will proceed through the pleading and
discovery stages, with the privilege being wielded as a scalpel
rather than a bludgeon. Combined with the other procedural
elements of the SSPA-including especially the role of special
masters, guardians-ad-litem, and the emphasis on finding
substitutions when possible-the net effect of this
"proceduralization" of the privilege should ensure more careful
tailoring to the facts and evidence in a particular case. This in
turn should reduce the risk of erroneous application (and thus
injustice). Though this benefit will come at the cost of increased
litigation expense and complexity, it is a cost that is most likely
worth bearing. At the very least, the experiment is worth
undertaking.
106. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) and 56.
107. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(a).
108. The statute also needs to be amended to ensure that the government
has an adequate opportunity to use the privilege in this fashion, meaning
that some form of notice will have to be given to the government by a party
intended to make use of information that may be subject to the privilege.
This precise dilemma is addressed in the criminal prosecution context by
CIPA § 5, which has been upheld against constitutional challenge on many
occasions. Presumably a comparable procedure can be added to the SSPA.
109. See State Secrets Protection Act, S. 2533, § 4054(a).
110. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953) (citing Totten v.
United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)).
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V. CONCLUSION
The SSPA will not entirely please either critics or supporters
of the state secrets status quo. By subjecting the privilege to a
more rigorous procedural framework, the SSPA may reduce the
range of cases in which the privilege is found to apply, and in
some respects it may cause marginal increases in the risk that
sensitive information will be disclosed (though with the
amendments proposed above such risks would be significantly
diminished). On the other hand, even under the SSPA, the
privilege will continue to have a harsh impact on litigants who
bring claims that implicate protected information: discovery will
still be denied, complaints will still be dismissed, and summary
judgment will still be granted. Such tradeoffs are inevitable,
however, in crafting legislation designed to reconcile such
important public values as national security, access to justice, and
democratic accountability. The SSPA has its flaws, to be sure, but
subject to the caveats noted above it marks an important step
forward in the ongoing evolution of the state secrets privilege.
